

*Tellie*

26 October 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director, ORE  
SUBJECT: Distribution of the CIA Weekly Summary  
REFERENCE: Your Memorandum to Executive, October 17th.

1. Will you have someone from your Publications Division get in touch with us next week re the above reference?
2. Briefly, we favor your paragraph 2 (a) but are doubtful about a classification of Top Secret.
3. We should like to know how many copies are now published each week, i.e., how many above the distribution list of 71 shown at end of each issue, and do those additional copies circulate only within CIA?
4. Also, who set up the original distribution list and how? Are there any requests for the Weekly which have not been granted? I assume the new requests you referred to are from ECA and FBI when the latter joined the IAC. And now will the Military Defense Assistance Pact bring in new requests?
5. I know that the Director has been willing to let the Weekly go to more interested "customers" than the Daily, but since you think it is getting out of hand we should like to talk over the above details and any pertinent other details with your Publications Division.

PRESCOTT CHILDS, Chief  
Coordination, Operations,  
and Policy Staff

17 October 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE

VIA : Chief, COPS

SUBJECT: Distribution of the CIA Weekly Summary

1. Requests are received from time to time from present recipients of the CIA Weekly Summary for an increase in the number of copies sent to their organizations; requests are also received from newly created organizations for inclusion in the distribution. The decisions concerning such increases in the distribution have been made, up to this time, on a piecemeal, ad hoc basis. What is needed is a clearly defined policy on the scope and character of the distribution of the CIA Weekly Summary, in the light of which the present distribution can be reviewed and future decisions concerning its increase can be made.

2. A policy on the distribution of the CIA Weekly Summary must: (a) take into account the intended purpose of the Weekly Summary and for whom it is designed; and (b) make it possible to strike a balance between servicing as many qualified recipients as possible and satisfying the security requirements of both CIA and the agencies which provide the raw information.

a. The CIA Weekly Summary was intended at its inception to be a weekly analytic review of trends and developments of the topmost importance, designed in format and manner of presentation for the highest levels of the US Government. Despite later increases in the distribution, the Weekly Summary still conforms pretty much to this pattern. If the Weekly Summary is to continue to get the attention of top-level readers, it must continue to be designed primarily for them. It must, in other words, deal for the most part only with matters which affect US security quite directly; it must be kept relatively general and brief, holding technical terms and details to a minimum; it must take a broad, national view as opposed to a regional or departmental view. (It ought, if possible, to be a TOP SECRET publication so that it can discuss all the problems of concern to high-level personnel.) Such a publication can be of only limited usefulness to readers on a level below the one for which it is designed, although -- quite naturally and humanly -- it will be of interest to them all.

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
b. Although there certainly can be no magic number for distribution of the CIA Weekly Summary which will precisely strike the necessary balance between optimum service and optimum security, there are limits beyond which security will not stretch. From a security point of view, an ideal distribution would include only the top-level personnel for whom the Weekly Summary is designed. Any extension of the distribution beyond that number ought to require a joint review by CIA and the intended recipient of the usefulness of the publication for his office. Unless usefulness or need -- not merely interest -- can be established, the individual ought not to be included in the distribution. Moreover, a decision ought to be made by CIA security personnel concerning the maximum limits to which the distribution of the Weekly Summary can be safely extended.

3. On the basis of the above considerations, it is recommended that:

a. A written policy for distribution of the CIA Weekly Summary be formulated either by an ad hoc committee or by the Coordination, Operations and Policy Staff, with provision being made in either event for full representation by the Publications Division.

b. A review of the present distribution be made by the above group and the revised list submitted to the DCI for approval and action.

c. A procedure be established by the above group for action on new requests for the Weekly Summary.

  
THEODORE BABBITT  
Assistant Director for  
Reports and Estimates

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CONCUR:

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Assistant Director for Collection and  
Dissemination

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3 MAY 1968

TO: Director of Central Intelligence  
FROM: Acting Assistant Director, Office of Collection and Dissemination  
SUBJECT: Adequacy Survey of the CIA Daily and Weekly Summaries

1. All officials who receive the CIA Daily and Weekly Summaries, or representatives of these officials, were interviewed recently to ascertain their reaction to the summaries and to obtain any suggestions they might have regarding possible improvements in these publications.

2. The most frequent comment made by recipients of the summaries was that the CIA comments have added to the value and readability of the Daily Summary. Representatives of the Department of State observed that, in their opinion, CIA was doing a better job than the Department in selecting and condensing the cables for inclusion in the Daily Summary. Other recipients felt that the Daily Summary would be improved either by limiting its contents to the "Top" intelligence items of the day or in some way flagging an item to be recognized as such.

3. Synopses of significant comments, details of individual interviews and additional special comments of Mr. Robert G. Barnes and Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis are attached for your information.



Colonel, CSC  
Acting Assistant Director for  
Collection and Dissemination

Incl. (4)

- TAB A - Synopsis of Significant Comments and Suggestions
- TAB B - Details of Individual Interviews
- TAB C - Comments of Mr. Robert G. Barnes
- TAB D - Comments of Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis

cc: ICAPS ✓  
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION SOURCES

AND COMMENTS

DAILY SUMMARY

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1. CIA is doing a better job of briefing the cable traffic than OII of the State Department. (Mr. Robert G. Barnes, Special Assistant to the Secretary; Mr. W. Fulk Armstrong, Special Assistant to the Secretary for Research and Intelligence.)
2. The CIA comments are a valuable addition to the Daily Summary. (Office of Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief; Office of Secretary of Defense; Secretary to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.)
3. The Situation Reports are interesting and valuable. (Secretary of Defense; Secretary of Army.)
4. The special evaluations are interesting and should be produced more frequently. (Secretary of Army; Assistant CEO /Political Military Affairs/)
5. The Daily Summary would be improved by the use of a special notation to indicate the "top" intelligence item. (Secretary of Air Force; Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations USAF.)
6. The Daily Summary should be limited to items of utmost significance. (Chief of Staff, USA; Director of Intelligence, USAF.)
7. The Daily Summary should continue to carry the brief summary of comments which it formerly contained. (Chief of Staff Designate, USAF.)
8. There is too much emphasis on political intelligence in the Daily Summary. (Deputy Director of Intelligence, HQ., USAF.)
9. There has been considerable improvement in the Daily and Weekly Summaries in the past 6 months. (Director of Intelligence, USAF.)

WEEKLY SUMMARY

10. The Weekly Summary is often repetition of the Daily Summary and occasionally contains information that is "old". (Office of Chief of Staff, USA.)
11. There are not enough articles in the Weekly Summary on Russia and her satellites. (Secretary, National Security Council)
12. The Weekly Summary often has some valuable special articles of which the recent one on the Palestine situation is an example. (Naval Able to the Frontline.)

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**DETAILS OF INDIVIDUAL INTERVIEW**

**THE DIRECTOR**

The Daily and Weekly Summaries are read regularly by the President. The President's copy is received by his Naval Aide, Capt. H. W. Donison, who reads the entire issue, marks significant items with a red pencil and occasionally writes on the outside cover to call to the attention of the President those items in which Donison thinks he will be particularly interested. Occasionally as he hands the summary to the President, Donison elaborates for a few sentences on an item he has marked. Captain Donison makes no attempt to brief the summaries as he feels that it is dangerous to attempt to brief material which has already been condensed.

Captain Donison says that the President finds the Summaries extremely useful and reads them every day. The recent special article on Palestine which appeared in the Weekly Summary was considered by Donison to be excellent. His suggestions for improvement of the Daily Summary are two: (1) discontinue the practice of references to previous issues of the summary and instead include a key sentence or two from the referenced item. Previous issues have usually been destroyed, returned to CIA, or for other reasons are not readily available as a reference, (2) CIA comments of non-agreements with a preceding item should be directly tied to the reasons for discrediting a "reliable source", rather than a general comment of non-agreement in a conclusion reached in the challenged report.

**SUMMARY OF AGENT**

The Secretary has not seen the Daily or Weekly Summaries for the past five months. Mr. Robert G. Barnes, Special Assistant to the Secretary, reads both the Daily and Weekly for Secretary Marshall, and if there is an item which the Secretary has not already seen, Barnes calls it to his attention. Barnes states however, that Secretary Marshall reads the same traffic on which most of the Daily and Weekly are based, and in addition, receives a daily sheet which Barnes prepares for him. Occasionally, an Army, Navy or Air item of significance will appear in the Daily and it is then called to the Secretary's attention by Barnes. No other individuals see the summaries.

Barnes has three criticisms of the summaries: (1) references to back issues which are not easily available should be replaced by a significant quote (if necessary) from the background material, (2) Barnes objects to what he described as the practice of using as CIA comment, the observations of the originator of the source dispatch. It should be made clear, according to Barnes, that CIA is merely concurring with an already evaluated dispatch, (3) when CIA considers a rumor

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analysis of the current Iranian situation inasmuch as nothing has been published on this subject for some time. Wooldridge stated that he felt that the Palestine evaluation should have been published prior to the announcement of partition.

Another comment by Rear Admiral Wooldridge is covered in a Top Secret supplemental report which is transmitted concurrently for your information.

The Secretary of the Navy reads his marked copy of the Daily Summary regularly and sees perhaps a third of the Weekly Summary. All hands are apparently satisfied with the production with the exception mentioned above. In closing the interview with Admiral Wooldridge, he mentioned that a continuing effort should be made to produce intelligence estimates on as timely a basis as is practicable. He feels this is being done in the Daily Summary but is not always true of the special evaluations. Captain Lee feels that a more satisfactory treatment for the Daily Summary would be a series of one or two sentence highlights rather than the paragraph treatment now given in that publication.

#### SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

The Secretary's copy is read daily by Mr. C. V. Whitney, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force and by Colonel Sweeney, his aide. Both Colonel Sweeney and Mr. Whitney occasionally flag an item for Mr. Symington, the Secretary. Col. Sweeney suggests a "box" at the top of the first page of the Daily Summary. The box would be filled only on days when there was one outstanding item of top significance; it otherwise would be left blank. Sweeney feels that in this way the day's top intelligence would be available at a glance and would not have to be screened from the remaining items of possibly lesser significance. Neither Mr. Whitney nor the Secretary have any specific comments with reference to the Daily or Weekly, but Col. Sweeney states that the publications are appreciated and read regularly by Mr. Whitney, who would have made some comment to Sweeney if they were unsatisfactory.

#### EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

The Daily and Weekly Summaries were discussed with Mr. James S. Ley, Jr., Deputy Executive Secretary of the Council, who stated that all the permanent members of the Council find the publications of use. Mr. Ley queried Mr. Sidney W. Souers, the named recipient, and relayed the information that Mr. Souers feels that CIA is doing a fine job insofar as he can tell. Mr. Souers emphasized that he did not see the material upon which CIA publications are based so he is not in a position

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two deputies. No specific comments were available from individual readers.

SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR RESEARCH AND INTELLIGENCE

Mr. W. Park Armstrong, the named recipient, stated that he believes that CIA is doing a better job than OIR of the Department of State in briefing the cables for use in the Daily Summary. The Weekly Summary is worthwhile if it can be circulated to key officials while it is still timely, according to Mr. Armstrong. Another comment by Mr. Armstrong is covered in a Top Secret supplemental report which is transmitted concurrently for your information.

DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, GSUSA

The Director's copy is read personally by him and by his deputy, Major General Bolling. It is also read by Col. Williams, Executive Director; Colonel Clarke, Assistant; and Colonel Ennis, Chief, Intelligence Group. In addition, the Daily and Weekly are read by the Chiefs of the various geographic branches (16). Major Edmondson, aide to Lt. General Chamberlin, asked that he survey all readers and get their views. Major Edmondson states that all readers feel that the Daily and Weekly are worthwhile publications, and that they are read regularly. Major Edmondson stated that none of the readers had a specific comment to make.

CHIEF OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

The Office of Naval Intelligence receives three copies each of the Daily and Weekly Summaries. These are given an initial combined distribution of 16 although they are read by more than this number. One copy goes to Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of Naval Intelligence and is read by both the Admiral and his Executive Assistant, Captain H. W. Baltazzi. During the course of an interview with Admiral Inglis he reiterated his previously expressed views that CIA should publish two summaries: one a Top Secret publication for very limited distribution and one no higher than Secret for wider distribution. The Admiral feels that by so doing, CIA would be serving the useful purpose of eliminating duplication and would free ONI of a percentage of effort in the field of political intelligence. Admiral Inglis estimates that 25% of the entire workload of ONI is devoted to the production of political and economic intelligence. (The Admiral's views on the alleged failure of CIA to produce enough political intelligence for the Navy is discussed in detail in a separate memorandum to Chief, Survey Division dated 9 March 1948, a copy of which is attached as TAB B.) The Admiral would like to see more special evaluations with particular emphasis on Soviet intentions and capabilities in Europe, etc.

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25 February 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Army Division

SUBJECT: State Department Views Relative to Current Distribution  
of CIA Daily Summary

1. During the course of an interview with Mr. Barnes, (Briefing Officer for the Secretary of State), which was held on 24 February 1968 in an effort to determine the views of the Department with reference to the Daily Summary (Project IB), Mr. Barnes stated very firmly that the Department is not pleased with the recent limited revision of the distribution of the Daily Summary.
2. According to Mr. Barnes, the Department feels that distribution should not be below the policy and operations level and should not include the intelligence offices of the IAC agencies.
3. Mr. Barnes explained that under the current State Department policy of furnishing high level copies to CIA, attention arises whereby the Daily Summary contains policy level content which the Department does not distribute internally, in some cases even to certain of its Assistant Secretaries. Under present distribution of the Daily Summary, this information is made available not only to intelligence offices of the Department, but to the opposite levels in the other IAC agencies.
4. Mr. Barnes referred to the letter of the DSI of 29 February to the Director of Executive Secretariat, Department of State, relative to the revised distribution. Barnes stated that although the Department does not concur with the contents of the letter, no reply is contemplated as the Department does not wish to give the impression of disagreeing with an apparent basic CIA concept as to who is eligible to receive the Daily Summary.
5. Mr. Barnes strongly intimated that the distribution of the Daily Summary indicates to the Department of State that CIA contemplates publishing an intelligence review rather than an operational and policy summary; Mr. Barnes indicated that future State Department dissemination to CIA might be guided accordingly.
6. Views of the Department as to format and editorial handling of the summary were generally favorable and will be discussed in full in the final report of the Agency Survey being conducted of recipients of the Daily and Weekly Summaries.

/s/



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9 March 1948

RECORDED BY: **Chief, Navy Division****SUBJECT:** **Comments of Rear Admiral Thomas R. Ingalls  
Chief of Naval Intelligence**

1. During the course of a current survey to determine the views of the recipients of the CIA Daily and Weekly Top Secret Summaries, an interview was held on 8 March 1948 with Admiral Ingalls, Chief of Naval Intelligence.

2. The Admiral opened the interview by observing that the Congress would soon be inquiring into the activities of the various governmental intelligence agencies with the aim of eliminating duplication or reducing appropriations if activities could not be justified.

3. It is becoming more difficult, according to the Admiral, to justify some of the duplication that now exists; CIA, for example, is devoting roughly 25% of its total headquarters effort to the production of political and economic intelligence most of which should be produced by CIA, in the opinion of Ingalls.


4. Secretly, the Admiral continued, it has been possible to explain that CIA was still getting organized and would eventually be in a position to give more service and free the MAU agencies to place more effort on their specialized intelligence efforts.

5. The time is rapidly approaching, Ingalls feels, when in justifying CIA appropriations to Congress, he will be called upon to take one of two positions; either he can show that (a) the activities of his Headquarters are devoted purely to naval intelligence necessary to the Department and thus justified, or (b) he will have to explain that CIA is unable to furnish the other type of intelligence and thus CIA is required to produce its own and needs funds commensurate with the additional responsibility. The Admiral said he would not like to be in the position of making the latter statement to a congressional committee, but felt that it could not be long avoided, unless CIA began to furnish more complete intelligence for wider distribution than is afforded by the Daily and Weekly Summaries.

6. Admiral Ingalls then reiterated a suggestion he had previously made to CIA for a summary classified no higher than Secret which could reach a larger number of users than the Daily and Weekly in their present form. Ingalls feels that this could replace the daily survey of cables and press which the Navy Department now produces.

7. The Admiral also feels that CIA should plan to do more of the production work on the forthcoming MAU series, as he feels CIA's present plans will not reduce

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